Political Science 220B                                                                                            Fall Quarter 2020

Professor Kaare W. Strøm                                                                           Tuesday 12:00-2:50

Office: Social Science Building 384                                                                                         R 243

Office Hours: Thursday 12-1 and by appointment                                        E-mail: kstrom@ucsd.edu

 

 

COMPARATIVE POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS

 

Objectives

This course investigates the origins, operation, and consequences of political institutions. Institutions are often thought of as the "rules of the game," within which political actors function and strategize. Alternatively, institutions can be thought of as entrenched organizations or as roles that people play in political life. Pragmatically, we will be examining the structures---mostly formal---that give order to the state and everyday political life: Constitutions, parliaments, political parties, electoral systems, and so forth. The class focuses in large part on democratic institutions, but we will also consider the role played by institutions in non-democracies. Toward the end of the quarter, we will dip into the large literature on political institutions' social and economic effects.

There are no prerequisites for this course other than graduate standing, although familiarity with the basic concepts of game theory and econometrics will be helpful. While open to graduate students in other related programs, this class is targeted toward PhD students in Political Science, and especially those in the field of Comparative Politics. The course has thus been designed to complement POLI 220A: State and Society. While we cover significant ground, PhD students in Comparative Politics will need to read beyond the required readings included here. Please consult the list of recommended readings and other courses in this field.     

 

The seminar is organized around ten themes:

1. Political Institutions and Institutional Analysis
2. Democracy: Origins and Types
3. Autocracy
4. Federalism, Consociationalism, and Powersharing
5. Elections and Party Systems
6. Party Organization and Clientelism
7. Presidentialism and Executives
8. Legislatures and Parliamentary Democracy
9. Bargaining, Bureaucracy, and Law
10. The Social Effects of Political Institutions

 

Format

The seminar will meet remotely on weekly basis on Tuesdays 12-2:50. Each week will introduce a new theme in the comparative study of political institutions and provide a set of required and recommended readings. Required readings (typically 5-6 pieces with a total length of approx. 150-200 pp. per week) will form the basis of the seminar discussions, and all students should read them carefully and critically before class. Recommended readings are supplementary readings of theoretical or empirical importance. If you are preparing for the comprehensive exam, you should gain familiarity at least with those that match your own area of specialization. Many of these readings are also suitable for seminar presentations and literature review papers.

 

Assignments

As a student in this seminar, you must do the assigned readings, write two discussion papers (with a maximum word limit), participate actively in seminar discussions, and give seminar presentations. Come to class prepared to discuss, critique, and defend all of the readings, and to do so actively. Be willing to ask simple questions---usually others will want to know the answer, too. Be respectful and wary of interrupting; don't monopolize the discussion. Students who need accommodations for any disability should request it at the earliest opportunity.

Presentations. For at least one seminar meeting during the quarter, you will be assigned to make a seminar presentation. These presentations (approx. 15-20 minutes in length, plus time for seminar discussion) should address a significant question in the relevant subfield, for example a study question assigned for that week, or a similar question chosen in consultation with the instructor.  Presentations should relate the relevant assigned literature, including some recommended readings and other scholarship as appropriate. Presentations should also follow these guidelines:
    - Briefly motivate your question: why does it matter?
    - Identify (a small number of) relevant readings that address your question directly or indirectly. Organize these readings and the debates they speak to.
    - Summarize the main claims in the literature regarding your question. Draw linkages across readings wherever possible ("One set of texts addresses the moral hazard wrought by these institutional arrangements; the other set..."). Tease out how the readings positively advance our knowledge.
    - Pinpoint some salient critiques. These may center on internal theoretical inconsistencies or unstated assumptions, restrictive scope conditions, flaws in research design, misinterpretation of results, etc. Be judicious and measured. Avoid hyperbole.
    - Conclude by offering two to four "big picture" questions to guide the subsequent class discussion and propose ways ahead.
The best presentations will lay out an incisive, analytical summary of the relevant scholarship, call attention to its main contributions and limitations, and set a fruitful agenda for a subsequent discussion.  Presentations should be no longer than 20 minutes.  You should prepare no more than 10 slides and practice the presentation beforehand.

 

Discussion Papers. The discussion papers will be on your choice among a set of assigned topics. The assignments are open-book and open-note. There will be a word limit – please respect it.  The papers should discuss relevant scholarship and, most importantly, make an argument. The argument should be stated clearly and concisely and guide the rest of the paper. You should engage in depth with the relevant class readings. Citing some outside readings, such as recommended ones on the course syllabus, is fine but not necessary for a top grade. There should be an argument running as a thread through the paper. Help the reader understand how each paragraph adds to the larger point you want to make. It is a good idea to state your thesis near the start of the paper ("In this paper, I argue that...").
    - Bring in empirical examples, but don't present tables, figures, or discuss cases at great length. The emphasis should mostly be on the theoretical claims. In this context, empirical cases are best used to illustrate your points instead of offering a rigorous test.
    - You may include a few short footnotes, but do not go overboard. Writing style matters. Be focused and succinct and avoid long quotations.  Be sure to provide proper references and to respect the university’s standards of academic integrity: (https://academicintegrity.ucsd.edu/).

Tentatively, the first of the discussion papers will be due on November 3 and the second one on December 10. Grades will be based on course assignments in the following way: Discussion papers 40% each, presentations and class participation 20%.  Extensions, incompletes, etc. will be given in accordance with UCSD policy. Except under very pressing circumstances, however, I discourage such options.

 

Readings

This seminar covers a large literature, much of which you may want to have at your disposal. The following books have been ordered by the UCSD Bookstore for this course:

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown Publishers.

Gary W. Cox (1997), Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arend Lijphart (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

1. Bingham Powell, Jr. (2019). Ideological Representation: Achieved and Astray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

George Tsebelis (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

These books are central to the field, but your purchasing decisions should be guided by your specific interests, your professional judgment, and your budget constraint.

 

 

1. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (October 6)

Required:

John M. Carey (2000).  “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.” Comparative Political Studies 33, 6-7: 735-61.

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996), “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44, 5: 936-57.

Paul Pierson (2000). “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 94, 2: 251-67.

George Tsebelis (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-11.

 

Recommended:

Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, eds. (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Avner Greif (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jack Knight (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1996).”Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions.” Governance 9, 3: 247-64.

Gary Miller (2000). “Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions,” Governance 13: 535-547.

Terry M. Moe (1990). “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 6, Special Issue: pp. 213-253 (and comments by Oliver Williamson, pp. 263-266).

Douglass C. North (1991). “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 97-112.

Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.) (1982), Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer.

Scott Page (2006). “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1: 87-115.

Kenneth A. Shepsle (1989). "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2:131-147.

Kathleen Thelen (1999). “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369-404.

Barry R. Weingast (2002). “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, (eds.). Political Science Discipline as Discipline: Reconsidering Power, Choice, and the State. New York: Norton.

Study Questions:

1. What is the best way to think about political institutions?
2. What is path dependency, and how important is it?
3. Can institutional analysis help us identify the good society?
4. How do we ensure that institutions are not merely parchment?

 

2. DEMOCRACY: ORIGINS AND TYPES (October 13)

Required:

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 2.

Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels (2014). Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 2-3.

Barbara Geddes (1999). “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?”Annual Review of Political Science  2: 115-144.

Arend Lijphart (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, chaps. 1-4.

Barry R. Weingast (1997). “Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law.” American Political Science Review 91, 2: 245-263.

Robert Woodberry (2012). “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy.” American Political Science Review 106, 2: 244-74.

 

Recommended:

Carles Boix (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roger D. Congleton (2011). Perfecting Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robert A. Dahl (1971). Polyarchy.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Francis Fukuyama (2014), Political Order and Political Decay.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Albert O. Hirschman (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009). Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mancur Olson (2000), Power and Prosperity. New York: Basic Books.

Adam Przeworski (2005). “Democracy as an Equilibrium,” Public Choice, 123, 3-4: 253-273.

Adam Przeworski et al. (2000). Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (1999). Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daniel S. Treisman (2020). “Democracy by Mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government.” American Political Science Review, 114, 3: 792-810.

Study Questions:

1. Is democracy a (social) class project?
2. What are the most important subtypes of democracy?
3. Does democratization depend on the right set of values?
4. Does social equality foster democracy, or does democracy foster social equality?

 

3. AUTOCRACY (October 20)

Required:

Lisa Blaydes (2010). Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 3.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, chap. 2.

Jennifer Gandhi (2010). Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 1.

Beatriz Magaloni (2006). Voting for Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Introduction andchap.1.

Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity. New York: Basic Books, 2000, chaps. 1-2 and 7.

Milan Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1-2.

 

Recommended:

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956), Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger.

Samuel P. Huntington (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg (1982), Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Margaret Levi (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds. (1978), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Barrington Moore (1966). The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.

Roger Myerson (2008). “The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State.” American Political Science Review, 102, 1: 125-139.

Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009). Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guillermo O’Donnell (1978). “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State.” Latin American Research Review 13, 1: 3-38.

Amos Perlmutter (1977), The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Adam Przeworski et al. (2000). Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gordon Tullock (1987), Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Ronald Wintrobe (1990), “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship.” American Political Science Review 84, 3: 850-72.

Study Questions:

1. What are the fundamental motives of rulers, and how do they matter?
2. What functions do elections serve under autocracy?
3. When are autocrats most vulnerable, and why does it matter?
4. For what purposes is it necessary to differentiate between autocracies?

 

 

4.                        FEDERALISM, CONSOCIATIONALISM, AND POWERSHARING (October 27)

Required:

Benjamin A. T. Graham, Michael K. Miller, and Kaare W. Strøm (2017). “Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival.” American Political Science Review 111, 4: 686-704.

Arend Lijphart (2012). Patterns of Democracy, chap. 10.

Jonathan Rodden (2006). Hamilton’s Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1 and 3.

Philip G. Roeder (2009). “Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms.” Regional and Federal Studies 19, 2: 203-19.

George Tsebelis (2002), Veto Players, chaps. 1 and 6.

Erik Wibbels (2006). “Madison in Baghdad? Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 165-188.

 

Recommended:

Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (2003). The Size of Nations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Jenna Bednar (2009), The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pablo Beramendi (2007). “Federalism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman (2004). “State Corroding Federalism.”Journal of Public Economics, 88, 3-4: 819-843.

Jacques Cremer and Thomas Palfrey (1999). “Political Confederation.” American Political Science Review 93, 1: 69-93.

Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova (2004), Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustaining

Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers.

1. Arthur Lewis (1965), Politics in West Africa. London: Allen and Unwin.

Arend Lijphart (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Arend Lijphart (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Pippa Norris (2008). Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1972). Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability.

Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.

William H. Riker (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown.

 Richard Rose (2000). “The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland.” Journal of Democracy 11, 2: 26-40.

Jürg Steiner (1974). Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland. Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press.

Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav (2011), Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational        Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Charles Tiebout (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-24.

Daniel Treisman (1999). After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

George Tsebelis (1990). Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, chap. 6.

Barry R. Weingast (1995). “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11, 1: 1-32.

Study Questions:

1. When does federalism succeed?
2. Is inclusion the most important feature of powersharing?
3. To what extent does path dependency help us understand the success or failure of powersharing?
4. Is there a credibility problem in federalism and decentralization?

 

5. ELECTIONS AND PARTY SYSTEMS (November 3)

Required:

Carles Boix (1999), “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.”American Political Science Review 93, 3: 609-24.

Gary W. Cox (1997), Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 2-4, 8, and 15.

Guy Grossman and Laura Paler (2015). “Using Field Experiments to Study Political Institutions.” In Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions.  Ed. Jennifer Gandhi and Ruben Ruiz-Rufino.  London: Taylor & Francis.

Arend Lijphart (2012), Patterns of Democracy, chaps. 5 and 8.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, pp. 1-64.

8. Bingham Powell, Jr. (2019). Ideological Representation: Achieved and Astray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1, 5, and 8.

 

Recommended:

Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young (1982). Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man,One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kathleen Bawn (1993), "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." American Journal of Political Science 37, 4: 965-89.

Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice (2007), “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems.”American Political Science Review 101, 3: 373-91.

Anthony Downs (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Maurice Duverger (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.

John Ferejohn (1986). “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice 30: 5-25.

Robert W. Jackman (1987). "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." American Political Science Review 81, 2: 405-23.

Arend Lijphart (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1. Bingham Powell, Jr. (2000). Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Adam Przeworski and John Sprague (1986). Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Douglas W. Rae. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

William H. Riker (1982). "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law." American Political Science Review 76, 4: 753-766.

Stein Rokkan (1970). Citizens, Elections, Parties. New York: David McKay.

Jennifer Rosen (2013). ”The Effects of Political Institutions on Women’s Political Representation: A Comparative Analysis of 168 Countries from 1992 to 2010.” Political Research Quarterly 66, 2: 306-21.

Giovanni Sartori (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matthew Singer (2013). “Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries.  British Journal of Political Science 43, 1: 201-20.

Alastair Smith (2004). Election Timing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Study Questions:

1. Does popular representation often go astray, and if so why?
2. To what extent do candidate selection procedures remove voters’ choice?
3. How are electoral systems chosen: Normative appeal, strategic choice, or path dependence?
4. Are representational biases in legislatures due to supply or demand?

 

6. PARTY ORGANIZATION AND CLIENTELISM (November 10)

Required:

John H. Aldrich (2011). Why Parties? A Second Look. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chaps. 1-2.

John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote.” Electoral Studies 14, 4: 417-39.

Kanchan Chandra (2007). Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 2-5.

Christopher J. Kam (2009), Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 2. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1995). “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of

the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1, 1: 5-28.

Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco (2013). Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1 and 8.

 

Recommended:

Leonardo R. Arriola (2013). Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver (2006). Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge.

Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006.

Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman (2004). The Formation of National Party Systems. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. (2000). Parties without Partisans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maurice Duverger (1954). Political Parties. London: Methuen.

Leon D. Epstein (1980). Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Donald Horowitz (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Herbert P. Kitschelt (1994), The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. eds. (2007). Patrons, Clients, and Politics: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti (2012). Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bonnie M. Meguid (2008). Party Competition between Unequals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robert Michels (1962). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Collier Books.

Wolfgang C. Müller (2000). Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work.  European Journal of Political Research 37, 3: 309-33.

Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds. (1999). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe

Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Angelo Panebianco (1988). Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

David Robertson (1976). A Theory of Party Competition. London: John Wiley.

Joseph A. Schlesinger (1991). Political Parties and the Winning of Office. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Daniel M. Smith (2018). Dynasties and Democracy.  Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Steven I. Wilkinson (2006). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Study Questions:

1. What reasons do citizens in democratic states have to distrust political parties?
2. Is class or ethnicity the most important basis of party organization?
3. Why do legislators accept party discipline, and when do they rebel?
4. Is the pursuit of a personal vote an impediment to democracy?

 

7. PRESIDENTIALISM AND EXECUTIVES (November 17)

Required:

Jose Antonio Cheibub (2007). Presidentialism Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 6.

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chap. 7.

Juan J. Linz (1990). “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1, 1: 51-69.

David J. Sam u els and Matthew S. Shu gart (2010). Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1-2.

Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 2-3.

George Tsebelis (2002), Veto Players, chap. 3.

 

Recommended:

Alexander Baturo (2014). Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, eds. (1998). Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

José Cheibub, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian Saiegh (2004). ”Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism,” British Journal of Political Science 34, 4: 565-587.

Maurice Duverger (1980). "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8, 2:165-87.

Arend Lijphart, ed. (1992). Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scott Mainwaring (1993). "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." Comparative

Political Studies 26, 2: 198-228.

Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds. (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

30. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1989). "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2: 107-30.

Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. (1999). Democracy, Accountability, and Representation.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jonathan Slapin (2011). Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Study Questions:

1. The Perils of Presidentalism: Design flaw, Latin American heritage, or fiction?
2. Does semi-presidentialism capture the best of both worlds?
3. Is the presence of multiple agents under presidentialism a good thing?
4. Should term limits be applied to presidents, legislators, neither or both?

 

8. LEGISLATURES AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (November 24)

Required:

Gary W. Cox (1987). The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 6.

Michael J. Laver and Kenneth Benoit (2015). “The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions,” American Journal of Political Science 59, 2: 275-91.

Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1990). "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science

Review 84, 3: 873-90.

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chaps. 6 and 11.

Kaare Strøm (2000). “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 37: 261-89.

George Tsebelis (2002). Veto Players, chaps. 4 and 9.

 

Recommended:

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks (1988). "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review 82, 2: 405-422.

David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989). “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83, 4: 1181-1206.

Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox (2007), “The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations.”

American Journal of Political Science 51, 2: 251-65.

Roger D. Congleton (2011). Perfecting Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daniel Diermeier (2014). “Formal Models of Legislatures.” In Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare W. Strøm (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29-56.

Herbert Döring, ed. (1995), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press.

John D. Huber (1996). "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." American Political Science Review 90, 2: 269-82.

John D. Huber (1997). Rationalizing Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo (2008). “Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracy.”American Political Science Review 102, 1: 169-80.

Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996). Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gregory M. Luebbert (1986). Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel.

New York: Columbia University Press.

Arthur W. Lupia and Kaare Strøm (1995). "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." American Political Science Review 89, 3: 648-65.

Pippa Norris, ed. (1997). Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matthew S. Palmer (1995). "The Economics of Organization and Ministerial Responsibility." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, 1:165-88.

Bjørn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.) (2011). The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting.  London: Routledge.

William H. Riker (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sebastian M. Saiegh (2011), Ruling by Statute: How Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. (2003). Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Daniel M. Smith (2010). “Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments.” Annual Review of Political Science 13: 517-35.

George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money (1997). Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paul Warwick (1994). Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Study Questions:

1. Parliamentary democracy: Glorious revolution or glorious evolution?
2. Did parties create strong assemblies, or did strong assemblies create parties?
3. Does coalition membership depend mainly on executive institutions, or on legislative arithmetic?
4. Do party leaders look for agreement, complementarity, or arithmetic in coalition bargaining?

 

9. BARGAINING, BUREAUCRACY, AND LAW (December 1)

 Required:

Robert H. Bates (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, chaps. 1-2.

  Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chaps. 12-13.

Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg (2011). Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chaps. 2-3.

Scott Desposato, Matt Ingram, and Osmar Lannes (2015). “Power, Composition, and Decision Making: The Behavioral Consequences of Institutional Reform on Brazil’s Supremo Tribunal Federal.”  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31, 3: 534–567.

John D. Huber and Charles Shipan (2011). “Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Ed. Robert E. Goodin.  Oxford: Oxford University Press,

George Tsebelis (2002). Veto Players, chap. 10.

 

Recommended:

John Ferejohn, Frances Rosenbluth, and Charles Shipan, “Comparative Judicial Politics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Gretchen Helmke. Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Gillian Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast (2014), “Microfoundations of the Rule of Law.” Annual Review of Political

Science 17: 21-42.

Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1998.

Gunnar Grendstad, William R. Shaffer, and Eric Waltenburg (2015), Policy Making in an Independent Judiciary: The Norwegian Supreme Court. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Fred S. McChesney (1997), Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Carol Mershon (2002), The Costs of Coalition. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

1. J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth (1997), Japan’s Political Marketplace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2. R. A. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller (2009), Comparing Westminster. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Petra Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones (2009), “Constitutional Power and Competing Risks.” American Political Science Review 103, 3: 496-512.

Study Questions:

1. Why do politicians in poor countries favor urban interests?
2. What are legislators most likely to be uncertain about, and how does it matter?
3. “Yes, Minister!” What is the key to the power of bureaucrats?
4. When are courts no more than parchment institutions?

 

10.          THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (December 8)

Required:

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown Publishers, chaps. 2-3 and 15.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith (2001). “Political Competition and Economic Growth.” Journal of Democracy 12,1.

Gary W. Cox (2016). Marketing Sovereign Promises.  New York: Cambridge University Press, chaps. 1 and 12.

Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner (2019). ”Does Direct Democracy Hurt Immigrant Minorities? Evidence from Naturalization Decisions in Switzerland.” American Journal of Political Science 63, 3: 530-547.

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chaps. 15-16.

Adam Przeworski (2004). “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition 39: 527-540.

 

Recommended:

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002). “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 1231-94.

Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik (1994). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 465-490.

Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” American Economic Review 94: 1190-1212.

Hernando De Soto (2000). The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books.

Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. “The new comparative economics,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 595-619.

William Easterly (2002). The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 9 (2004). “Do Institutions Cause Growth?,” Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271-303.

Avner Greif (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Philip Keefer (2004). “What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development -- and Vice Versa?” Annual Review of Political Science 7: 247-272.

Douglass C. North (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.

Douglass C. North, (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mancur Olson (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effect of Constitutions. MIT Press.

Adam Przeworski et al. (2000). Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 3.

Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 9: 131-165.

Jeffrey D. Sachs (2005). The End of Poverty. London: Penguin Books.

Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman. “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14: 217-232.

David Stasavage (2003). Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Study Questions:

1. Is the power of the purse the critical legislative power?
2. What matters most to policy performance: regime type, cabinet type, or electoral system?
3. How can we know whether institutions matter?
4. Under what conditions is autocracy good for public policy?